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ABSTRACT 
This paper provides a theoretical framework to study the effects of implementing price 
limit policy on price movements and trading behaviors. Due to the high difficulty of 
isolating effects of price limits in empirical data, it is useful to develop a model to 
simulate the theoretically possible effects of enforcing price limits on stock trading. In 
addition, we offer two ways of expanding the model into 2-segments that could 
differentiate the effects of having price limits on individual investors from institutional 
investors. According to our model, hitting price limits can be summarized to eight 
different short-term scenarios and each results in different effects on the direction of price 
movement and short-term liquidity in the next trading period. Besides offering a 
theoretical perspective on price limit effects, our model provides two new ways of 
approaching price limits in stock market: i) it can be simplified to the identification of the 
eight types of patterns and ii) it can be transformed to a study of investor composition and 
their behaviors on risk bearing with the presence of price limits.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Intraday price limit policy has been widely used across regions and markets. It is 
particularly favored by the emerging markets for stabilization. As of today, it is a notable 
feature of the Chinese stock market. It was first implemented on December 16th, 1996 at 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The daily price fluctuation of a single stock has 
been set to be 10 percent of the previous closing price for regular stocks and 5 percent for 
special treatment (ST) stocks.  
The debate over the existence of price limit policy itself has been far from 
unanimous. On one hand, price limit advocates claim that it effectively manages short-
term volatility in stock price fluctuations by offering a “time-out” or “cool-off period”, 
that it mitigates overreactions of frenzied traders, and that it does not interfere with 
normal trading activities. On the other hand, critics argue that the price limits cause 
higher volatility on subsequent trading days, that the policy delays the reaching of market 
equilibrium level, and that it does interfere with normal trading.  
There are two main arguments for the policy to exist in China. First, it keeps the 
market stabilized by managing short-term volatility during unusual and sudden 
circumstances such as extreme company news, global financial crisis, systematic 
economic crush, unforeseeable disasters, and stock manipulation. Second, it protects 
individual investors by offering them more time to receive and digest information. 
Whether the government should intervene to stabilize the market and protect individual 
investors from the institutional investors are beyond the scope of this project. This 
research only aims to investigate the potential effect of the price limit policy.  
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While there have been many empirical studies on the effects of the price limit policy 
in different markets, it is hard to control for all other factors and quantify the impact on 
stock price and trading behaviors caused by price limit policy. Thus, it is helpful to build 
a theoretical framework which enables us to isolate the effects of having price limits in 
trading.  
In summary, this research seeks to model the theoretical effects of the intraday price 
limit. Results from the project are expected to not only add to the debate on price limit 
policy itself with a theoretical framework, but also to offer some insights to the policy 
makers and market regulators. Section 2 of the paper presents past literature on the 
effects of price limits. Section 3 describes our general model for stock trading, price 
movements, and price limits trigger. Section 4 analyzes both short-term and long-term 
effects of price limits based on the general model. Section 5 offers two ways of 
expanding the general model to accommodate two segments of investors. Section 6 
acknowledges some limitations of the model and points out potential directions for future 
studies. We concludes the paper in section 7.   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Early research concerning price limit policy first appeared in light of the market crush in 
October 1987. Greenwald and Stein (1991) stated that panic had contributed to market 
crush. In response to this, many research was conducted to see if mechanisms such as 
price limit, trading halt and circuit breaker should be put into place. There was some 
previous work that touched upon these topics. Lee, Ready, and Seguin (1994) 
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investigated trading halt and concluded it would increase, rather than decrease, both 
volume and volatility.  
Many papers were written based on the futures market. Ma, Rao, and Sears (1989a), 
for instance, examined futures market using both daily and intraday level data. They 
found empirical evidence on the reversal behavior after price limits were hit, disproving 
the delay hypothesis. This conclusion, however, was challenged by Lehmann (1989) by 
stating that the study of Ma et al. (1989a) failed to take into the imbalance effect caused 
by the existence of both patient and impatient traders. In another word, price behaviors in 
the limit-hitting neighborhood could provide little information. Fama (1989) also 
challenged the effectiveness of price limits by arguing that the increased volatility found 
was simply because of the interference to price discovery process.  
Kim and Rhee (1997) tested the three main hypotheses regarding the effectiveness of 
price limits, the volatility spillover, the delayed price discovery, and the trading 
interference hypothesis, by looking at data from Tokyo Stock Exchange. Their evidence 
suggested that price limits might be ineffective. Similar results were found by Phylaktis, 
Kavussanos, and Manalis (2000) based on Athens Stock Exchange, showing that price 
limits had no significant effect on stock volatility. The policy merely slowed down the 
process of reaching to equilibrium. Yet research based on some markets showed different 
results. Berkman and Lee (2002) used data from Korean Stock Exchange to study the 
effect of widened price limits. Evidence showed that widened limits did increase 
volatility, suggesting that price limits were managing volatility to some extent. Hsieh, 
Kim, and Yang (2009) examined the magnet effect of price limits based on data from the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange. They used a logit model to show that the conditional probability 
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of price movements increased when approaching price limits, which supported the 
existence of magnet effect. Another study based on the Taiwan Stock Exchange by 
Chang and Hsieh (2008) showed mixed evidence, supporting only one out of the three 
hypotheses.  
Some research has also been conducted to investigate price limit policy in China. 
Kim, Liu, and Yang (2013) compared two periods of the Chinese stock market. During 
1992 to 1996, China did not have price limits policy. This was changed in 1996. They 
concluded that price limits in China could help facilitate price discovery and reduce 
volatility. They claimed that no magnet effects were found. Lu (2016) did a research 
based on cross-listed stocks in mainland China and Hong Kong. This quasi-natural 
experiment found that the delay of efficient price discovery, the volatility spillover and 
the trading interference become statistically insignificant when stocks were actively 
traded. 
Given the controversial debates over the price limits and mixed evidence from 
previous literature on various datasets, it is worth developing a framework that is helpful 
to examine the theoretical impacts of price limits in hope of contributing to the ongoing 
discussions and offering new perspectives to approach future empirical studies.  
 
MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Here we develop a general model to simulate the trading environment and price 
movement of a single risky asset. More specifically, the model describes the price 
movement of a stock, which is driven by trading activities of potential investors. The 
model begins and ends at equilibrium with price being equal to the expected true value of 
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the stock and with the market being cleared. After establishing the initial model, price 
limits are added as boundaries for price movement in each period. Ultimately, this model 
aims to i) describe theoretically how price limits are hit and triggered in trading; ii) offer 
a way of quantifying the effects from price limits in various perspectives; and iii) 
explain how each underlying factor contributes to the effects of implementing price 
limits. A list of notations for the model is shown below:  
 
Table 1: General model notations 
N Total potential investors for the given risk asset (stock) 
Bt Total shares of buy orders at time t 
St Total shares of sell orders at time t 
Dt Difference between total shares of buy and sell orders  
p0 Initial (previously formed) equilibrium price 
?̃?0~ N(v0, σ0
2) Initial true value of the risky asset (stock) at time 0 
?̃?𝑛𝑒𝑤 ~ N(vnew, σnew
2) New true value of the risky asset (stock) 
bt Average risk a buyer takes at time t 
st Average risk a seller takes at time t 
βp Price elasticity of the risky asset 
Φ(𝑝𝑡, 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤, 𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑤) Cumulative distribution function 
𝑝𝑡
′ Price movement with the presence of price limits 
 
Trading Behavior 
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At given time t, the amount of total buy and sell orders is determined by three factors. 
First, it is affected by total number of potential investors that are interested in this asset. 
For instance, total number of potential investors is likely to be less for a tobacco 
company. Second, it is influenced by the percentage of the potential investors whose 
perceived true values of stock are higher or lower than the current market price. In 
another word, it is calculated by using the cumulative distribution function with the 
current price and the normally distributed true value perception. See figure 1 below. 
Lastly, it is affected the average amount of risk that each buyer and seller choose to take. 
This factor can also be understood as a function of the investor’s amount of available 
capital plus the degree of risk aversion.  
Buy (Sell) orders = #𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑢𝑦 (𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙) ∙ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
𝐵𝑡 = 𝑁 ∙ [1 − Φ(𝑝𝑡−1, 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤, 𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑤)] ∙ 𝑏𝑡 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝑁 ∙ Φ(𝑝𝑡−1, 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤, 𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑤) ∙ 𝑠𝑡 
Figure 1 
 
Price Movement 
Many previous research have touched upon potential reasons for price impacts and price 
elasticity. Shleifer (1986), for instance, tested a downward sloping demand curve for 
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stock. Scholes (1972) presented the three hypotheses: the price-pressure hypothesis, 
substitution hypothesis, and the information hypothesis. These three hypotheses were 
frequently mentioned and tested empirically in later studies such as Mikkelson and Partch 
(1985), Harris and Gurel (1986), Chan and Lakonishok (1993) etc. In addition, Loderer, 
Cooney, and Van Drunen (1991) tested the price elasticity of demand for common stocks. 
The underlying assumption of our model draws insight from these three hypotheses.  
Price movement in our model is strictly subject to the changes in the demand of the 
stock and the elasticity of the demand curve. That is, change in demand of a stock is 
represented as the differences between total buy and sell orders in the current market. In 
another word, the imbalance of total buy and sell orders can be seen as a shortage of 
liquidity and the difference between buy and sell intentions will put pressure on the price 
movement by the measure of this stock’s price elasticity. Our assumption can also be 
interpreted as a slow process of adjusting to new information regarding the true value of 
the stock.  
Our model starts with a risky asset (stock) at equilibrium where market is cleared 
with the same amount of buy and sell orders. In addition, initial price is equal to the true 
value of the asset.  
{
𝐷0 = 𝐵0 − 𝑆0 = 0
𝑝0 = 𝑣0
 
There is a shock to the expected true value of the stock. True value of the stock is shifted 
to ?̃?𝑛𝑒𝑤 ~ N(vnew, σnew
2), throwing the model off from equilibrium with an unbalanced 
and uncleared market being formed. Note that we adopt a normal distribution for the 
expected true value of assets similar to Kyle (1985).  
{
𝐷 ≠ 0
𝑝 ≠ 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤
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Given the amount of unbalanced orders on the market, price will move towards the new 
expected true value of stock and the amount of movement is determined by the stock’s 
price elasticity. While it is assumed that the price elasticity is unique to individual stocks, 
we take it as a relatively stable parameter for each stock and will remain constant in our 
model. The model is rebalanced when the new equilibrium is reached at t=T.  
𝑝𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡−1 + β𝑝 · 𝐷𝑡  
until 
{
𝐷𝑇 = 𝐵𝑇 − 𝑆𝑇 = 0
𝑝𝑇 = 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤
 
Price Limits 
Including price limits in our model is simply adding upper and lower bounds for the price 
movements in each period. Like what China has been using for its stock market, we set 
the price limits to be ±10% for each period.   
0.9𝑝𝑡−1 ≤ 𝑝𝑡 ≤  1.1𝑝𝑡−1 
 
MODEL ANALYSIS 
General Model Behavior 
We now move to model analysis and draw some insights. First, it is worth noting that the 
vanilla model, the general model without price limits, is not a closed form model. In 
another word, it does not guarantee to reach and stabilize at vnew. This is mainly due to 
the unpredictable risk factors at any given period. See figure 2 below for an example, 
where p0 = 15, vnew = 20. Furthermore, due to the nature of the risk factor, we set risk 
factors to be nonstationary in our model to focus on the study of price limits.    
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Figure 2 
 
Another interesting observation from the simulation is that having price limits can be 
helpful in certain situations where new equilibriums are not reached due to a combination 
of all factors. While in some of these situations price movement will not converge both 
with and without price limits, there are times when price limits can make the price 
converge to the new equilibrium. See figure 3 below for an example. Due to the 
assumption that buying and selling risk factors remain constant through our interested 
period, a stable and dynamic price bounce is formed instead of a single new equilibrium. 
Adding the price limits in the model, however, will lead to a stabilized equilibrium. Note 
that the new equilibrium formed with price limits is not equal to the expected true value 
of the asset vnew.   
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Figure 3 
 
 
Under our model, price limits are hit and trigged when  
β𝑝
𝑝𝑡−1
∙ |𝑁{[1 − Φ(𝑝𝑡−1, 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤, 𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑤)] ∙ 𝑏𝑡 −  Φ(𝑝𝑡−1, 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤, 𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑤) ∙ 𝑠𝑡}| > 0.1 
We can draw some quick insights from this equation. First, all else equal, a bigger pool of 
potential investors of a given stock leads to higher probability of hitting price limits. 
Second, all else equal, a higher price elasticity of stock leads to higher probability of 
hitting price limits. Third, all else equal, stocks with smaller closing price from the 
previous period are more likely to hit the price limits. Fourth, there exists asymmetry 
between effects from the risk factors of buyers and sellers.  
 
Short-term Behaviors 
In this section, we analyze the potential short-term effects that price limits can cause 
under the theoretical framework of our model. Here we assume that unit time is equal to a 
single trading day. When price limits are hit, there are only eight categories of scenarios 
based on the relative positions of current price with price limits 𝑝𝑡
′, current price without 
15.00
16.00
17.00
18.00
19.00
20.00
21.00
22.00
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39
Unreaching of Equlibrium with Limits 
p_t w/o price limit
p_t w/ price limit
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price limits 𝑝𝑡, and the expected true value of the asset vnew. After presenting the eight 
types of situations, we focus on three potential short-term effects that can be caused by 
hitting price limits: i) “distance” to the new equilibrium price; ii) change in size and 
direction of price movement; and iii) market liquidity in the next period.  
First, we look at eight possible scenarios after price limits are hit, which are 
illustrated below as figure 4 to 11. Notice that the four scenarios on the left-hand side, i.e. 
figure 4, 6, 8, and 10, all result in the upper limits being hit and the current prices with 
price limits 𝑝𝑡
′ are lower than 𝑝𝑡. And the four scenarios on the right-hand side, i.e. figure 
5, 7, 9, and 11, are the opposite where lower limits are hit and current prices with price 
limits are higher than 𝑝𝑡. Also note that it is entirely possible for price to move farther 
away from the new equilibrium. This can happen when the “minorities” of likely 
investors, either buyers or sellers, are somehow more certain with their beliefs of the true 
value or are willing to take more risks and therefore heavier positions.   
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The effect of price limits on “distance” to the new equilibrium is most straightforward. In 
situations like figure 4 and 5, 𝑝𝑡
′ is farther away from vnew than 𝑝𝑡. That is,  
|𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤 − 𝑝𝑡
′| > |𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤 − 𝑝𝑡| 
In situations like figure 8, 9, 10, and 11, 𝑝𝑡
′ is closer to vnew than 𝑝𝑡. That is,  
|𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤 − 𝑝𝑡
′| < |𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤 − 𝑝𝑡| 
And in situations like figure 6 and 7, it is undetermined. Thus, if given the frequency of 
appearances for each type of scenarios, we can have a sense of how often price limits 
cause a short-term delay and acceleration of price moving into the new equilibrium.  
 Next, we will look at the potential effects that price limits can bring in terms of 
changes in sizes and directions of price movements. Theoretically, the size and direction 
of price movement in the next trading period depend on the difference between next 
period’s total buy and sell orders. More specifically, we look at  
𝐷𝑡+1 = 𝐵𝑡+1 − 𝑆𝑡+1 = 𝑁{[1 − Φ(𝑝𝑡, 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤 , 𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑤)] ∙ 𝑏𝑡+1 −  Φ(𝑝𝑡, 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤 , 𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑤) ∙ 𝑠𝑡+1} 
and 
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𝐷𝑡+1
′ = 𝐵𝑡+1
′ − 𝑆𝑡+1
′ = 𝑁{[1 − Φ(𝑝𝑡
′, 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤 , 𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑤)] ∙ 𝑏𝑡+1
′ −  Φ(𝑝𝑡
′ , 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤 , 𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑤) ∙ 𝑠𝑡+1
′ } 
Thus, there will be a change in direction of next period’s price movement if  
𝐷𝑡+1
𝐷𝑡+1
′ < 0 
And the impact on the size of price movements will be  
β𝑝 · (𝐷𝑡+1
′ − 𝐷𝑡+1) 
Thus, it is obvious that the short-term effects on size and direction of price movement 
depend on both the investors’ risk-taking behaviors and the relative positions of prices 
and new equilibrium in the eight scenarios. If we assume that the settings of risk factors 
allow the price to move towards the new equilibrium in the next period, then the effects 
on direction of price movements will only rely on which of the eight situations we are in. 
In situations like figure 6 and 7, for instance, where 𝑝𝑡
′ and 𝑝𝑡are on different side of vnew, 
price will move towards different directions. These can be seen as effective “cool-off” 
periods for overreacting investors.  
 Lastly, we can draw some insights regarding the impact of price limits on short-term 
liquidity. Here we define short-term liquidity as the number of shares traded each period. 
This can be written as min(Bt+1, St+1) versus min(𝐵𝑡+1
′ , 𝑆𝑡+1
′ ). If we assume that hitting 
price limits does not alter the risk factor of buyers and sellers and the risk factors remain 
stable from period to period, then the impact on short-term liquidity can be transformed 
to the first effect, i.e. the “distance” to new equilibrium price. That is, if current price 
with price limits is farther away from the new equilibrium price and the assumptions we 
have just made for the risk factors hold, then there will be a shortage of short-term 
liquidity in the next trading period.   
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Long-term Behaviors 
Here we show some results of how price limits can affect price movement and trading in 
the long-term. Long-term effects are harder to gauge since it is a cumulation of different 
short-term effects. We first lay out the theoretical impact below. Then we display several 
long-run simulations.   
According to out model, differences between total buy and sell orders at any given 
time (Dt) in the market is the primary driver of price movement. Thus, it is essential to 
show how the price limit policy can influence D in the long-run. First, we assume the risk 
factors bt and st is unaffected by hitting the price limits. Then the cumulative difference 
caused by price limits will be 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑖𝑛 𝐷 = 𝑁 ∙ ∑(𝑏𝑡+1+𝑠𝑡+1)
𝑇
𝑡=0
∙ [Φ(𝑝𝑡 , 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤 , 𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑤) − Φ(𝑝𝑡
′ , 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤 , 𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑤)] 
Now we allow the risk factors to change in the event of price limits being triggered. That 
is, people will act differently when price limits are hit due to signal effects. Then the total 
cumulative difference in D will become 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑖𝑛 𝐷𝑡
′ − 𝐷𝑡 = 𝑁 ∙ ∑ 𝑏𝑡+1
′ [1 − Φ(𝑝𝑡
′)] − 𝑠𝑡+1
′ Φ(𝑝𝑡
′) − 𝑏𝑡+1[1 − Φ(𝑝𝑡)] +
𝑇
𝑡=0
𝑠𝑡+1Φ(𝑝𝑡) 
In addition to knowing the cumulative differences in D, we can also calculate the total 
shares traded during the entire course of equilibrium reaching. As we specified above, for 
each time period t, we say that the number of traded shares is equal to min(Bt, St). Thus, 
the total amount of long-term liquidity L during the path to equilibrium can be described 
as:  
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L = ∑ min (Bt, St)
T
t=0
 
L′ = ∑ min (𝐵𝑡
′, 𝑆𝑡
′)
T
t=0
 
And the cumulative effects of price limits on long-term liquidity can thus be written as  
L′ − L 
Again, the long-run effects can be interpreted as cumulations of short-term effects that we 
have analyzed above. Since the theoretical results are not very intuitive, we ran some 
simulations with assumptions on variables and parameters to show some of the potential 
impacts.  
Before getting into the long-term effect of price limits, one thing that is not so 
obvious from the model itself and the price limit hitting equation above is the role of 
standard deviation. Standard deviation can be interpreted as an indicator of heterogeneity 
in people’s perception of the true value. For instance, a large standard deviation indicates 
that within the group of investors the perception of true asset value is widely distributed. 
It is certain that the relationship between standard deviation and the time of reaching 
equilibrium is monotonic. A simulation with all else equal and variation in the standard 
deviation is shown below. Notice from the graph that when σnew = 2, it takes longer for 
price to reach the new equilibrium with more fluctuation.   
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Figure 12 
 
 
Next, in the cases where a new equilibrium can be reached, we found that having a price 
limit could lead to different long-term effects. That is, the reaching of equilibrium can be 
delayed, accelerated, or unaffected. Each case can be found in the figures below.  
 
Figure 13 
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Figure 14 
 
Figure 15 
 
In summary, while price limits have been triggered and hit in all three scenarios above 
and caused different short-term effects, having price limits can have quite different 
impacts over price movements and the reaching of equilibrium in the long-run.   
 
2-SEGMENT MODEL 
Model Expansion 
Building on the general model described above, we can incorporate segmentation of 
investors to further differentiate the effects of price limits on individual versus 
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institutional investors. Here we offer two different methods of model expansion that will 
rely on slightly different assumptions.  
 
Expansion 1 
We assume that the normal distribution of the precepted true values are jointly formed by 
both individual and institutional investors. In addition, we assume that individual and 
institutional investors have different “risk factors”, which means different size of 
available capital size and degree of risk aversion. While it is reasonable to assume that 
institutional investors as a group should always have more available capital for any stock 
they are interested in, the degree of risk aversion is much harder to assume in advance. 
That is, instead of representing the average risk buyers (sellers) choose to take with bt, st, 
it will be calculated as weighted average of individual and institutional buyers (sellers). 
Table 2: 2-Segment Model-1 Notations 
γ Ratio of individual investors over institutional investors 
π𝑡
𝑏 Percentage of buyer being individual investors at time t 
π𝑡
𝑠 Percentage of seller being individual investors at time t 
𝑏𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑑 Average risk an individual buyer takes 
𝑠𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑑 Average risk an individual seller takes 
𝑏𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑠 Average risk an institutional buyer takes 
𝑠𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑠 Average risk an institutional seller takes 
 
The overall risk factor for buyers and sellers at time t is calculated as weighted average of 
individual and institutional investors’ risk factors at time t. See table 3 below. 
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Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that boundaries exist for some of these 
parameters. 
Table 3 
 Buyer Seller 
Individual (%) πbt π
s
t 
Institutional (%) 1 - πbt 1 - π
s
t 
Weighted Average  π𝑡
𝑏 ∙ 𝑏𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑑 + (1 − π𝑡
𝑏) ∙ 𝑏𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑠 π𝑡
𝑠 ∙ 𝑏𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑑 + (1 − π𝑡
𝑠) ∙ 𝑏𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑠 
 
γ =
𝑁 ∙ [1 − Φ(𝑝𝑡−1, 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤, 𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑤)] ∙ π𝑡
𝑏 + 𝑁 ∙ Φ(𝑝𝑡−1, 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤, 𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑤) ∙ π𝑡
𝑠
𝑁 ∙ [1 − Φ(𝑝𝑡−1, 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤, 𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑤)] ∙ (1 − π𝑡
𝑏) + 𝑁 ∙ Φ(𝑝𝑡−1, 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤, 𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑤) ∙ (1 − π𝑡)
𝑠  
{
0 ≤ π𝑡
𝑏 ≤ 1
0 ≤ π𝑡
𝑠 ≤ 1
0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
 
Thus, 𝐷𝑡 =  𝐵𝑡 − 𝑆𝑡, where  
{
𝐵𝑡 = 𝑁 ∙ [1 − Φ(𝑝𝑡−1, 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤, 𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑤)] ∙ [π𝑡
𝑏 ∙ 𝑏𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑑 + (1 − π𝑡
𝑏) ∙ 𝑏𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑠]
𝑆𝑡 = 𝑁 ∙ Φ(𝑝𝑡−1, 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤, 𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑤) ∙ [π𝑡
𝑠 ∙ 𝑏𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑑 + (1 − π𝑡
𝑠) ∙ 𝑏𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑠]
 
 
Expansion 2 
Instead of doing the segmentation of individual versus institutional investors on the same 
normal distribution, we can argue that individual and institutional investors have their 
own distributions for the expected true value of the stock, which include both different 
expected true value and the standard deviation of the consensus distributions. Similar to 
the first expansion above, we assume different risk factors for the two groups of 
investors.  
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Table 4: 2-Segment Model-2 Notations 
γ Ratio of individual investors over institutional investors 
?̃?𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑖𝑛𝑑~ N(𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑖𝑛𝑑 , 𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑖𝑛𝑑 2) New true value of the risky asset (stock) for individual investors 
?̃?𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑖𝑛𝑠~ N(𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑖𝑛𝑠 , 𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑖𝑛𝑠 2) New true value of the risky asset (stock) for institutional investors 
𝑏𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑑 Average risk an individual buyer takes 
𝑠𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑑 Average risk an individual seller takes 
𝑏𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑠 Average risk an institutional buyer takes 
𝑠𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑠 Average risk an institutional seller takes 
 
𝐷𝑡 =  𝐵𝑡 − 𝑆𝑡, where 
𝐵𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝐵𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑑 = 
γ
γ+1
∙ 𝑁 ∙ [1 − Φ(𝑝𝑡−1, 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑖𝑛𝑑 , 𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑖𝑛𝑑 )] ∙ 𝑏𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑑 +
1
γ+1
∙ 𝑁 ∙ [1 − Φ(𝑝𝑡−1, 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑖𝑛𝑠 , 𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑖𝑛𝑠 )] ∙ 𝑏𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑠 
and  
𝑆𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝑆𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑑 =
γ
γ + 1
∙ 𝑁 ∙ Φ(𝑝𝑡−1, 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑖𝑛𝑑 , 𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑖𝑛𝑑 ) ∙ 𝑠𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑑 +
1
γ + 1
∙ 𝑁 ∙ Φ(𝑝𝑡−1, 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑖𝑛𝑠 , 𝜎𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑖𝑛𝑠 ) ∙ 𝑏𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑠 
 
The new equilibrium is reached when price is stabilized at 𝑝𝑇.  
 
Model Discussion 
While the 2-segment models can only offer us a theoretical expansion and it is hard to 
gauge the impact from price limits on institutional versus individual investors without 
running complex simulations, we can still draw some limited insights from it. First, it 
serves as a reminder that merely differentiating individual and individual investors based 
on the speed of identifying information is a limited view. We must also consider their risk 
factors, that is, their ability to take risk and allocate capital at any given time. Second, 
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price limits can cause different effects can only effectively protect individual investors if 
they are positioned in the “correct” directions. However, it seems that even we can 
simulate different scenarios for individual versus institutional investors, it is hard to 
justify the implementation of price limit policy with providing protections for individual 
investors.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE STUDIES 
Despite the inferences and insights that this theoretical framework can provide us, we 
also acknowledge some short-comings of the analysis. First, this model is built upon 
various assumptions that could be challenged in the real world. For instance, it is very 
likely that the new equilibrium price, i.e., vnew, is constantly changing before the 
equilibrium is reached. Similarly, the standard deviation of expected true value of the 
asset could also change instantaneously as time progresses.  
 Another limitation of this paper exists with the fact that the model was not applied to 
empirical data. Future studies can rely on the model to test several things, including the 
frequency of appearances for the eight different scenarios. It would also be helpful if 
future studies can use this framework to assess how price limits serve as signal to affect 
risk bearing activities of both individual and institutional investors.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper offers a theoretical model for stock trading that can incorporate price limits. 
This model allows us to examine the effect of price limit policy in stock market by both 
looking at some theoretical results and running simulations under the framework. The 
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general model identifies eight scenarios of hitting price limit, each of which will be likely 
to result in different consequences on the following trading period and thus turns the 
problem of price limit study into the identification of the frequency of these eight patterns 
in real world data. We also offer two possible model expansions to include the 
perspective of individual versus institutional investors. In conclusion, under our model, 
the existence of price limits cannot be theoretically justified due to a lack of consensual 
and beneficial impact.  
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